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Abstract
This paper documents the existence of striking regional diﬁerences in the re-
ported behaviour of employees working within the same ﬂrm but in diﬁerent Ital-
ian regions. In particular, the frequency of recorded and punished misconduct
episodes is signiﬂcantly higher among employees working in the south; migrants
moving from the north to the south assimilate completely to the higher rate of
misconduct in the receiving region while migrants moving from the south to the
north assimilate only partially to the lower misconduct rate in the receiving region.
These diﬁerences can in principle be attributed to discrimination or to individual
eﬁort. The absence of any evidence of regional discrimination in the process by
which misconduct episodes are reported to the personnel o–ce and in terms of ca-
reers and earnings suggests that the second explanation is more likely to be true.
This conclusion is supported also by the evidence on absenteeism that replicates
the ﬂndings on misconduct.
The hypothesis of discrimination had to be ﬂrst dismissed before the existence
of true regional diﬁerences in individual eﬁort could be accepted. Now, the search
for the possible ultimate causes of these diﬁerences comes next in our research
agenda.
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All errors are ours.1 Introduction
This paper documents the existence of striking regional di®erences in the reported be-
haviour of employees working within the same ¯rm but in di®erent Italian regions. In
particular, the frequency of recorded and punished misconduct episodes is signi¯cantly
higher among employees working in the south; migrants moving from the north to the
south assimilate completely to the higher rate of misconduct in the receiving region
while migrants moving from the south to the north assimilate only partially to the lower
misconduct rate in the receiving region. Therefore, a signi¯cant positive e®ect of the
southern region of birth on the probability of misconduct remains even after controlling
for the region of work and for a wealth of other observable individual characteristics.
These results may indicate the existence of factors that reduce the productivity of
employees working or born in the south. But one cannot accept this interpretation with-
out having previously excluded that they might indicate the existence of discrimination
due to the way in which misconduct episodes are reported to the personnel o±ce and
punished by the latter.1
In addition to documenting the evidence, this paper is aimed at understanding
which of these two interpretations is the correct one and the main conclusion is that the
hypothesis of discrimination is not supported by the data. This conclusion is reached
on the basis of the following evidence. The institutional process by which misconduct
episodes are brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce does not seem to be charac-
terised by features that lead to any form of systematic discrimination. Nor there is any
evidence that misconduct episodes of the same type and gravity are punished di®erently
in di®erent regions. At the same time, additional collateral evidence on promotions and
compensation levels allows to exclude with con¯dence the existence of discrimination on
a regional basis in terms of careers and earnings; in these cases, the absence of regional
discrimination is particularly evident if one compares regional di®erences with gender
di®erences. Finally, the evidence on another potential indicator of lower productivity,
i.e. absenteeism, replicates almost exactly the evidence on the frequency of misconduct
episodes: while statistics on the Italian population show, if anything, a lower incidence
of diseases in southern regions, absenteeism for health related reasons is substantially
higher among employees working in the south; in this case an interesting di®erence with
respect to misconduct episodes is given by the facts that migrants tend to fully assimilate
to stayers in both receiving region, so that, controlling for the region of work, the region
of birth becomes completely insigni¯cant as a determinant of absenteeism.
Putting together this collage of evidence, regional di®erences in the frequency of
misconduct episodes matched by analogous di®erences in the incidence of absenteeism
can hardly be attributed to discrimination. If this conclusion is accepted, the evidence
documented in this paper indicates the existence of regional productivity di®erentials
due to individual e®ort. Checking whether the hypothesis of discrimination could be
dismissed was a necessary ¯rst step before searching for alternative explanations of these
regional di®erentials. But now, the search for these explanations is the natural next step
1Whatever the interpretation, the signiﬂcance of these results is enhanced by the fact that they
jumped out of data collected for totally diﬁerent research purposes, i.e. for a study of the selection of
cases for trial in litigations concerning unjust dismissals.
1in our research agenda.
This paper is organised as follows. After a description of the data in section 2,
section 3 documents the basic evidence on misconduct episodes. Section 4 examines the
process through which misconduct episodes are brought to the attention of the personnel
o±ce and punished by the latter and shows no evidence of discrimination on this side.
Section 5 presents collateral evidence that allows to exclude the existence of discrimina-
tion in terms of careers and earnings. Section 6 shows that the evidence on absenteeism
supports instead the hypothesis of di®erentials due to individual e®ort. The last section
gives a summary of the results and indicates the main line of research on which we plan
to focus in the future to explain the observed evidence.
2 The Data
The ¯rm studied in this paper is a large bank with branches in every province of the
Italian territory. Table 1 reports the level of employment at the ¯rm and its regional
distribution for the 1974-1994 period on which the analysis is focused.2 Looking at the
distribution by region of work in the top panel, approximately 67% of total employment
is concentrated in the north, where the head-quarters of the ¯rm are located, but the
presence of the ¯rm in the other regions has always been signi¯cant and increasing with
time. Employment by region of birth (the bottom panel) is more uniformly distributed
across regions, as one would expect given the migration °ows that characterised the
Italian labor market during the '50s and '60s.3
From the personnel department of this bank we received several ¯les containing, for
di®erent aspects of the employment relationship, information on all the relevant events
characterising the history of each employee at the bank. In particular the ¯les contain
information on: 1) employee's characteristics independent of time at the ¯rm, like date
and region of birth, education (level, type and grade) and previous working experience;
2) compensation levels in 1994 and individual or collective wage increases and bonuses
over the entire period; 3) careers, promotions, job descriptions and turnover between
branches; 4) union membership for 1994 and union leadership position; 5) family loads
for 1994; 6) supervisors evaluations; 7) reason and duration of absence and late arrival
episodes; 8) merit, disciplinary measures and dismissals on disciplinary ground.4
The information contained in these original ¯les has been reorganised for the anal-
ysis into a panel data set with one observation per year for each worker on payroll in
2The observations concerning workers born or working abroad (less than 3% of the total) have been
dropped given the focus of the paper.
3For a description of these ￿ows see Ichino and Goria (1994). The north is deﬂned as the geographic
area covered by the following administrative regions: Valle D’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia,
Veneto, Trentino, Friuli and Emilia Romagna. The center includes: Toscana, Marche, Lazio Umbria
and Sardegna. The south includes: Abruzzi, Molise, Puglie, Basilicata, Campania, Calabria and Sicilia.
4Compensation levels before 1994 and other information linked to compensation payments, like union
membership and family loads will be provided by the ﬂrm in the near future. They were not provided
initially with the rest of the data because of a recent change in the computing system at the ﬂrm that
delayed the possibility to access certain archive ﬂles. Almost twelve months have been necessary to
prepare the data for the analysis.
2the month of November of each year between 1974 and 1994.5 The panel contains infor-
mation on 28651 workers observed for a maximum of 21 years, amounting to a total of
373781 worker-year observations. Employment per year grows from a minimum of 15103
units in 1974 to a maximum of 19072 units in 1984, and then declines to 17913 units in
1994. 23.7% of the employees are observed over the entire period.6
For each employee in a given year (i.e. for each observation in the panel) we created
three types of variables based on the information contained in the original ¯les:
A) variables describing events like promotions, wage bonuses, supervisors' evaluations
or absence episodes, etc, occurring to a worker during the 12 months that follow
the month of November of each year (we will refer to these 12 months as to the
outcome period)7;
B) variables describing the characteristics of each worker as observed in the month of
November of each year, like the hierarchical level, the wage, the working location
or the union status, etc., of the worker;
C) variables describing the history of the worker before the outcome period, like the date
and place of birth, the number of previous wage increases, promotions, absence
episodes, or the average supervisors' evaluations in the past.
The research strategy guiding this reorganisation of the data is aimed at looking at the
e®ects of the retrospective variables (B) and (C) on the outcome variables (A).
In this paper the focus is concentrated in particular on one of these outcome vari-
ables that indicates whether an episode of misbehavior of a worker has been reported
to the personnel o±ce during the outcome period, and whether the personnel o±ce
punished this misbehavior with a disciplinary measure.8 Inasmuch as these misconduct
episodes appear to be concentrated within certain groups of employees (e.g. regional
groups), two very di®erent interpretations of their signi¯cance are in principle possible:
they could be interpreted as an indication that low productivity is more likely among
employees in those groups, but also as an indication of discrimination against them.
For the ¯rst interpretation to be true, a necessary condition is that all (or a random
sample of) misconduct episodes are reported to the personnel o±ce and that the latter
5The choice of November is motivated by the fact that this is a relatively uneventful month for the
industrial relations at the ﬂrm, and therefore oﬁers the possibility to take a snapshot image of the
employment situation at the ﬂrm in normal conditions.
6Total employment in selected years is described in the bottom panel dedicated to the region of birth
in table 1. Due to missing information on the region of work for few workers temporarily not assigned
to any branch, ﬂgures on total employment in the top panel by region of work do not represent correctly
the true crossectional dimension of the panel in each year; diﬁerences are, however, minimal.
7Therefore, the period covered by this study goes from 1974 to 1994 if one considers the time (month
of November) in which the snapshot image of employment at the ﬂrm is taken in each year; but it goes
from 1975 to 1995 if one considers the outcome periods that follow the month of November. In what
follows we will use both time deﬂnitions according to which one is relevant for the speciﬂc variable under
consideration
8We do not have information on episodes of misbehavior that were not reported to the personnel
o–ce or that were not considered by the latter as serious enough to deserve a punishment. In section 4
we characterise the nature of these misconduct episodes and the process by which they are brought to
the attention of the personnel o–ce.
3decides impartially on the disciplinary measure that has to be issued. On the contrary,
evidence that the signalling process and/or the punishment decision are biased against
some groups of workers would suggest that the second interpretation is the relevant one.
Understanding the process by which misconduct episodes are reported to the per-
sonnel o±ce and the determinants of the decision of the latter concerning their punish-
ment is therefore crucial if one wants to discriminate between the two interpretations.
But ¯rst, in order to motivate the analysis, we present in the next section evidence
showing that the frequency of recorded and punished misconduct episodes is signi¯cantly
higher in southern Italian regions.
3 Misconduct Episodes and Regions of Birth and
Work
Table 2 describes the raw frequencies of misconduct episodes by region of birth, by
region of work and by each cell obtained combining birth and working regions. These
frequencies are computed as the ratio between the number of misconduct episodes in
each regional cell divided by the total number of worker-year observations in the same
cell.
The raw average frequency over the entire sample is 0.9%. Looking at the evidence
by region of birth (the last column in table 2) the frequency of misconduct is lowest in
the north (0.7%), intermediate in the center (1.1%) and highest in the south (1.4%). By
region of work (the last row), the regional di®erence is even larger going from 0.7% in
the north to 1.2% in the center and up to 1.6% in the south. Column 1 and 2 of table
3 report the odds ratios (for the center and for the south with respect to the north)
estimated using logit models of the probability of misconduct.9 The odds of misconduct
are estimated to be 2.1 times higher if an employee is born in the south as opposed to the
north, and 2.4 time higher if an employee works in the south as opposed to the north.
These odds ratios are not only signi¯cantly di®erent from 1 in their dimension, but,
given the size of the sample, they are also signi¯cantly di®erent in a statistical sense.
Whether caused by discrimination or by lack of individual e®ort, misconduct
episodes appear to be strongly related to the regional working environment as well as
to the regional birth environment in which an employee grew up. Since the correlation
between region of birth and region of work is .72, the next relevant question is to mea-
sure the net e®ect of the working environment controlling for the birth environment,
and viceversa. As shown in column 3 of table 3, when both work and birth regional
dummies are included, central and southern working conditions are no longer di®erent
between each other, but the di®erence with respect to the north remains statistically and
quantitatively signi¯cant: independently of the region of birth those not working in the
north are approximately 80% more likely to be reported and punished for misbehavior.
But what is perhaps even more striking is that the southern region of birth remains
statistically and quantitatively signi¯cant even controlling for the region of work: i.e.,
9Note that odds ratios greater than one imply that the variable is positively associated with greater
frequency of misconduct; odds ratios equal to one imply no association; odds ratios lower than one imply
negative association.
4workers born in the south, independently of the region of work, are 35% more likely to
be associated with misconduct episodes.
These regional e®ects remain basically unchanged and equally signi¯cant when one
controls for years and individual characteristics, as shown in the remaining columns of
table 3. Column 4 adds the estimation of a linear time spline with knots equally spaced
over the 1975-1995 outcome periods. The time e®ects are mild if compared with the
regional e®ects. The odds of a misconduct episode increase slightly during the 80-84
period, and then decline in the following one, while remaining constant in the ¯rst and
last intervals. The inclusion of these time e®ects is clearly without consequences for the
regional odds ratios.
Column 5 adds \non-behavioral" individual characteristics: females are approxi-
mately 50% less likely to be associated with misbehavior; one additional year of education
reduces by 5% the odds of misconduct, while the reduction implied by one additional
year of tenure is equal to 1%; the odds that white collars and blucollars get involved in
misconduct episodes are respectively 14% and 19% lower than for managers;10 previous
experience outside the bank also reduces by 2% the odds of misconduct.11 Despite the
fact that these individual characteristics are all statistically signi¯cant (and some also
quantitatively signi¯cant) the regional odds ratios appear una®ected in column 5.
The robustness of the regional di®erences is even more surprising in column 6 where
several retrospective indicators of good or bad behavior of the worker are added to the
regression and shown to be important determinants of the probability of misconduct.
The numbers of previous promotions and of previous wage increases per year of tenure
reduce the likelihood of misconduct. However, for reasonable changes of these variables
measured at the sample averages these e®ects are relatively small.12 Stronger and some-
what surprising is instead the positive e®ect of the total number of levels jumped at
promotions per year of tenure. This is an indication that \fast tracks" lead to more
misbehavior controlling for wage increases and number of promotions.13 Finally, past
turnover between branches has insigni¯cant e®ects, while the e®ect of the number of pre-
vious absence episodes, due to illness, per year of tenure is positive.14 Once again, even
controlling for all these e®ects the regional di®erences in the likelihood of misconduct
appear unchanged.
Further crucial insights on the role of working and birth environments can be
gathered by the evidence on the frequency of misconduct for each combination of region
of birth and work. These frequencies are reported in table 2 (rows and columns 1 to
10As discussed in a forthcoming paper on this issue, managers have higher incentives and opportunities
to commit internal violations that, as shown in table 6 are the most frequent in our sample.
11Leaving out low service workers, almost 99% of the employees at this bank are hired at the lowest
white collar entry level. The fact that the few workers hired at higher levels and with previous work
experience are less prone to misconduct is an interesting piece of information to be interpreted within
models of learning under asymmetric information on the quality of the worker; this is another issue that
will be explored in forthcoming research.
12On average there is 1 promotion and 0.1 non-contractual wage increases every ten years.
13On average the total number of levels jumped per year of tenure is 1.4. One interpretation of this
result, that will be analysed in greater depth in forthcoming research, is that workers on fast tracks
takes greater risks.
14The sample average in this case is 1.2 episodes per year, with a recorded maximum of 26 episodes
per year.
53): while the workers born and working in the north are characterised by the lowest
frequency of misconduct, this frequency increases if either the region of work or the
region of birth changes towards south (i.e. moving down and right in the table). Table
4 shows that most of these di®erences are not only quantitatively but also statistically
signi¯cant. The ¯rst three columns in this table report the odds ratios of misconduct by
region of work estimated separately for the subsamples of workers born in the di®erent
regions. The last three columns report instead the odds ratios by region of birth for the
subsamples of employees working in the di®erent regions.15
The most striking evidence o®ered by these two tables concerns the odds of misbe-
havior for those who migrated (at least once) from north to south, or viceversa, between
birth and the time of observation.16 Among those born in the north (column 1 of table
4, those working in the south are 2.4 times more likely to be associated with miscon-
duct episodes than those working in the north; viceversa among those born in the south
(column 3 of table 4) those who remain there are 80% more likely to misbehave than
those who move to the north. These e®ects are so large that (see table 2) southerners
working in the north become less likely to misbehave than northerners working in the
south . Therefore, whether misconduct is caused by discrimination or is evidence of
low productivity, the working environment is clearly extremely important because it is
capable to invert the ranking of the region of birth in terms of frequency of misconduct:
while on average those born in the south are more likely to misbehave than those born
in the north migration in opposite direction inverts the ranking.
However, the e®ect of the working environment is not symmetric. While migrants
from north to south almost completely assimilate to the southerners working there, for
those moving in the opposite direction assimilation is far from complete. This is shown
in the last columns of Table 4. In particular, in column 6, among those working in the
south, those coming from the north are basically identical to southerners17; viceversa,
in columns 4 among those working in the north, southerners are 40% more likely to
misbehave than northerners.
Finally, looking just at column 4 one might think that the frequency of misconduct
is just a result of diversity, in the sense that in any given region those coming from
outside are more likely to be associated with misbehavior (once again either because of
discrimination or because e®ectively less productive as a result of some kind of cultural
shock). Yet columns 5 and 6 dismiss this possibility: among those working in the center,
15Therefore, the ﬂrst (last) three columns of table 4 correspond to the rows (columns) of table 2
16In the analysis of these results it should be noted that although the number of worker-year observa-
tions on which these regressions are estimated is large, the number of employees involved is in some cases
relatively low. In 1974, 34% of those born in the south were working in the north, but less than 1% of
those born in the north were working in the south; the analogous percentages are respectively 31% and
0.7% in 1984 and 28% and 0.8% in 1994. Slightly larger are the migration movements between the north
or the south and the center. From the point of view of the working region, in each year approximately
10% of those working in the north are born in the south and approximately 3% of those working in the
south are born in the north and these proportions are more or less constant over the entire period. All
in all, out of the 28651 workers observed in the sample, 2510 (9%) are born in the south but work in
the north in at least one year while 225 (0.8%) are those born in the north and working in the south.
The relative dimension of these migration ￿ows are comparable in size to the historical ￿ows at the
aggregate national level. The absolute size is small but it seems su–cient to generate interesting and
reliable results at least for the case of migrants from south to north.
17Note however that this result could also be explained by the small sample size
6the frequency of misconduct is lower (or at most equal in terms of statistical signi¯cance)
for those who are diverse because of birth in the north; among those working in the south,
immigrants are at most equally misbehaving but certainly not more prone to misbehavior
than natives.
The evidence presented so far shows unambiguously that regions matter. But
matter for what? The episodes of misconduct recorded and punished by the personnel
o±ce indicate discrimination or lower individual e®ort? In order to ¯nd an answer to
this question we begin in the next section by looking at how misconduct episodes are
brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce and what determines the intensity of
their punishment.
4 Emergence and Punishment of Misconduct Episodes
4.1 More on the Data
Out of the 373781 worker-year observations in the panel, the number of misconduct
episodes recorded and punished by the personnel o±ce is 3404 (0.9%).18 These miscon-
duct episodes concern 2689 workers and therefore some workers have been reported for
misbehavior in more than one year. Since the total number of workers considered in this
study is 28651, the percentage of workers who misbehaved at least once in the 21 years
of observation is equal to 9.4%
Table 5 shows the distribution of punishments issued for the 3404 misconduct
episodes recorded by the personnel o±ce. These punishments are ordered in terms of
severity within a hierarchy established by collective bargaining: from the least serious
verbal reproach to the ultimate level that implies ¯ring and that in some instances induces
a \voluntary" quit. With the exclusion of verbal reproaches, sect. 7 of the Statuto dei
Lavoratori19 foresees that the punishments cannot be issued if the employer (in our case:
the personnel o±ce of the company) has not previously given to the employee a written
notice containing a detailed description of the misconduct episode; the employee has then
¯ve days for a written or verbal reply. In all these cases, of course, also the punishment
itself has to be issued in written form. It is possible that a written notice of misconduct
is issued but no letter of punishment follows, because the personnel o±ce, after receiving
the employee's reply, decides to limit the sanction to a verbal reproach.
The legal division of the personnel o±ce keeps a complete and reliable record of the
letters of notice of misconduct and of the communications of sanction issued since 1980.
These letters are a fundamental source of information for this research because they give
18The real number of episodes is in fact slightly larger because of the cases in which more than one
misconduct episode has been recorded for the same worker in the same outcome period. In these cases
only the episodes characterised by greater gravity (see below for the measure of gravity) have been
included in the sample. 90 episodes have been dropped for this reason.
19The Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law 20 May 1970, n. 300) is the chart of workers rights that regu-
lates the most crucial aspects of Italian industrial relations. For a description in English of the main
characteristics of Italian industrial relations, see Erickson and Ichino (1994) and Bertola and Ichino
(1995).
7a detailed description of the type of misconduct and of punishment. We were given access
to this archive from which we gathered information on 1859 cases of misconduct which
correspond to 63% of the 2952 cases occurred since 1980. A large part of the di®erence
is due to cases for which no written notice was required; a smaller part is due to the fact
that the letters and the computerised ¯les on punishments came from di®erent divisions
in the personnel o±ce and the matching between the two sources of information has not
been straightforward. In the end, despite the di±culties, the merging procedure was
quite successful since it failed in only 66 cases in which the letter was missing (3.9% of
the 1678 cases that should have merged because a letter was required). These cases were
dropped from the analysis. In addition we have also 247 written notices of misconduct
for cases in which in the end only a verbal sanction was issued.
In what follows, whenever the analysis takes into consideration the type and gravity
of misbehavior, we refer to the subsample of 1859 cases occurred after 1980 and for
which a full description of the misconduct episode is available. Otherwise, as in tables
1-4 the whole sample of worker-year observations with 3404 cases of misconduct will be
considered.
4.2 How Misconduct Episodes are Reported to the Personnel
O±ce
The central personnel o±ce is the only authority in the company entitled to issue dis-
ciplinary sanctions if these are more serious than verbal reproaches; therefore, at least
for these more severe sanctions, the punishment process is fully centralised at the head
quarters of the bank, but it is conditional on the fact that misbehaviour episodes emerge
and are reported to the personnel o±ce.20
The ways in which misconduct episodes are brought to the attention of the per-
sonnel o±ce di®er according to the nature of the episodes. Following the classi¯cation
described in Benvenuti (1997) there are four relevant categories of misbehaviour:
i. unjusti¯ed late arrival and absence episodes;
ii. external violations, i.e. actions taken by a worker outside the employment rela-
tionship with the bank, but potentially relevant for the latter (e.g. fraud, theft,
drug smuggling, working activity in competition with the bank, etc);
iii. internal violations, i.e. violations of the internal regulations of the bank (e.g.
omitted controls on checks or new accounts, irregular operations on the stock
market, credit to unreliable customers, etc);
iv. inappropriate behavior inside the workplace and insubordination (e.g. sexual ha-
rassment, improper dressing, violence or insults against colleagues, superiors or
clients, etc)
20The fact that one category of written reproaches is labelled as \local" (see table 5) just indicates a
reproach of lower gravity and has no real meaning as far as the punishment procedure is concerned.
8This classi¯cation is primarily based on the content of each misconduct episode but from
the point of view of this paper it is crucial also because it corresponds to di®erent ways
in which episodes are brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce.
Episodes of type 2 and 3 emerge in ways that are largely out of the control of local
directors of branches and fairly independent of possible regional biases within the person-
nel o±ce. For example, within the category 2 (external violations), episodes of excessive
personal debt exposure, dud cheques or criminal law infringements, are brought to the
surface by quite visible procedures that have their own life outside and independently
of the bank (like, respectively, the distrainment of the employee's wage, the bouncing
of a cheque in another bank or the noti¯cation of impending criminal investigation by
the public prosecutor). Often these procedures reach the attention of the head quarters
independently of local supervisors and in any case even the most prone-to-collusion di-
rector of a local branch would not dare to hide these cases of misconduct given the high
risk of being caught soon or later, facing very serious disciplinary measures.
Internal violations, i.e. episodes concerning the technical implementation of bank-
ing services related to the job description of each employee, are primarily brought to the
attention of the personnel o±ce through routine inspections sent without notice in each
local branch, o±cially once every two years on average. These inspections are performed
by managerial employees that depend directly from the security department at the cen-
tral head quarters. If southern branches were inspected more frequently than northern
branches it would be natural to suspect a discriminatory attitude of the personnel o±ce;
but this is not the case: in a randomly chosen year (1988), while 36.6% of the northern
branches were inspected, the same happened to only 26.5% of the southern branches.
A residual fraction of episodes of type 3 emerges as a consequences of special in-
spections sent to a local branch if some speci¯c disfunctions are observed. For example,
if the frequency of \su®ering" loans is too high or if a fraud by third parties against the
company is denounced a special inspection is always sent. Sometimes, while looking at
the entire documentation concerning the local branch, these special inspections discover
misconduct episodes of type 3 that are not necessarily related to the disfunctioning that
originally motivated the inspection. This feature of the inspection process may lead
to regional di®erences in the observed frequency of misconduct if the disfunctions that
cause special inspections are more frequent in the south independently of the employees'
behaviour. For examples, if insolvencies are larger in the south because of the weak-
ness of the economy in the \Mezzogiorno", special inspections could be more frequent
there and even if the employees' propensity to misbehave were equal in the south and in
the north, southern employees would be more frequently inspected and possibly caught
shirking. But the evidence is that the frequency of special inspections in southern and
northern branches is approximately the same in the randomly chosen year 1988 (11.8%
ad 11.6% respectively).
Episodes of type 1 and 4 instead reach the personnel o±ce only if the director
of the local branch denounces them. Therefore, in this case the frequency of recorded
episodes may di®er substantially from the frequency of real episodes because of collusion
between local directors and their subordinates or because of discriminatory attitudes or
other idiosyncratic characteristics of the former.
In particular as far as absences due to illness are concerned, the Italian Law gives to
9family doctors complete freedom in the evaluation of the state of illness of the employee
and in the decision concerning the number of days that are necessary for a full recovery.
In a world without collusion and moral hazard this would be perfectly reasonable, but
in practice any Italian worker willing to stay home for few days can do it even if he/she
is not really sick without any substantial risk of a disciplinary sanction. The length of
authorisations to absences depends only on the sense of duty of the doctors to whom
the employees ask for the authorisation. Section 5 of the already quoted \Statuto dei
Lavoratori" foresees that the employer can ask that the state of illness of an employee
is inspected by a public medical service. Unjusti¯ed absence episodes occur when an
employee remains at home without exhibiting a medical certi¯cate or when inspections
do not ¯nd at home an employee supposed to be sick. Evidently the fact that inspections
are sent out depends only on the willingness of the local director who is also the only
one who may decide whether a delay has to be considered justi¯ed or not.21
It is fairly obvious that without the co-operation of local supervisors, routine or
special inspections by the Security Department cannot identify late arrivals, unjusti¯ed
absences or unacceptable behaviour on the workplace.
4.3 Type, Gravity and Punishment of Misconduct Episodes
Table 6 describes the distribution of misconduct episodes across the four types described
above. The category of internal violations features the highest frequency followed by
external violations, while the cases of unjusti¯ed absence and of unacceptable behaviour
on the workplace are substantially less frequent. More interesting from the point of
view of this paper is the fact that regional di®erences exist not only in the overall
frequency of misconduct, as shown in section 3, but also in the frequency of the di®erent
types of misconduct. Table 7 reports the regional odds ratios for each misconduct type,
computed from a multinomial logit regression in which the excluded category is no
misconduct. This table is particularly important in the light of the above discussion
on the mechanisms through which the di®erent types of misbehavior emerge and are
reported to the personnel o±ce.
As far as unjusti¯ed absences and late arrivals are concerned, the odds of misbe-
haviour are signi¯cantly larger for employees working in the center with respect to those
born and working in the north. The odds are also larger for employees born in the south,
but they are lower or at most equal for employees working in the south. These results are
somewhat surprising if compared with those presented in tables 15-19 that describe how
the region of work and birth a®ect the number of all episodes of absence due to illness,
including the justi¯ed ones: in these tables employees working in the center appear to
be signi¯cantly more prone to illness (both justi¯ed and unjusti¯ed), but the same is
true also for employees working in the south, that in table 7 are shown instead to be as
likely as those working in the north to be late or absent without justi¯cations.22
Since, as argued above, unjusti¯ed absence and late arrival can only be brought to
the attention of the personnel o±ce by local supervisors this evidence suggests that in
21In some cases, employees who should be sick at home according to a medical certiﬂcate are discovered
working for a diﬁerent employer.
22We will come back to these tables at greater length in section 6
10the south the propensity to illness creates the conditions for collusion between supervi-
sors and employees. This collusion leads to a signi¯cant under reporting of unjusti¯ed
episodes. Note that the same type of collusive agreement does not seem to prevail in the
center were both justi¯ed and unjusti¯ed episodes are substantially more frequent.
Coming back to table 7, like in the case of unjusti¯ed absence, also in the case of
incorrect behavior on the workplace all cases of misconduct are brought to the attention
of the personnel o±ce by local supervisors. Table 7 shows that workers born or working
in the south are more likely to be involved in this type of misconduct, but odds ratios
are not precisely estimated and one cannot exclude the hypothesis of absence of regional
di®erences. This again may suggest the existence of collusion between employees and
supervisors in the south, but in this case there is no equivalent of the total number of
absence episodes to get insights on the validity of this hypothesis.
Where, in table 7, regional di®erences appear both quantitatively and signi¯cantly
more evident is in the case of internal and external violations. When they misbehave,
employees working in the center and in the south are much more likely to be involved
in these two types of violations than in the other categories. Southerner employees are
particularly prone to internal violations while central employees tend to run into external
violations. From the point of view of birth, instead, the category of external violations
is the one in which southerners are more frequently involved.
As argued above, among the four types of misconduct, internal and external viola-
tions are the types more likely to be brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce in
a way that more closely corresponds to the real dimension of the phenomenon. These
episodes, in fact, emerge because of external procedures, random internal inspections or
signalling at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. The evidence concerning internal vio-
lations, that are generally discovered through inspections, is particularly striking: while
southern branches are inspected less often (see section 4.2), employees working in the
south are more frequently involved in this type of misconduct episodes.
Given the importance of internal and external violations, we repeated the analysis
presented in tables 2-4 restricting the dependent variable to indicate just the episodes
of external or internal violation. In the interest of space we do not present the resulting
tables here, but as expected from table 7 regional di®erences maintain the same sign and
become much more dramatic in terms of both quantitative and statistical signi¯cance.
Moving to the analysis of the gravity of misconduct episodes, Table 8 reports its
distribution for the 1980-1995 outcome periods across the 8 levels identi¯ed by Benvenuti
(1997). This ordinal ranking of gravity, and the related classi¯cation of misconduct types
described above, have been prepared and discussed in a series of interviews with members
of the personnel o±ce for research goals totally unrelated with the ones of this paper, i.e.
for a study of labor con°icts and of the selection of cases for trials. For most misconduct
episodes the classi¯cation into higher gravity levels was dictated by the nature of the
misconduct type: for example, the length of the absence, the extension of debt exposure,
the sum involved in the fraud etc. It other cases it has been left to the judgement of the
personnel o±cers. The equivalence across types has also been established with the help
of the personnel o±ce and with reference to criteria that were claimed to be relevant for
1995.
11Table 9 reports ordered logit estimates of the probability that an employee is in-
volved in misconduct episodes of increasing gravity. The estimation is conditional on the
existence of a misconduct episode, i.e. this table tell us which factors are correlated with
greater misconduct gravity given that an episode of misconduct has been observed.23
While the region of birth is estimated to be irrelevant, employees working in the
south appear to get involved in episodes of greater gravity if they misbehave. These
e®ects remain signi¯cant at the 5% level even when individual characteristics are con-
trolled for in columns 5 and 6.24 Further evidence on the existence of collusion between
employees and supervisors as far as unjusti¯ed absence episodes are concerned, is o®ered
by the analysis of the gravity of misconduct restricted to this type of misbehavior. While
apparently more prone to illness (see section 6, employees born and working in the south
appear to be signi¯cantly less likely to be involved in unjusti¯ed absences of greater
gravity i.e. greater length.25
As argued above, the classi¯cation of misconduct gravity has been performed inde-
pendently of any regional consideration. Therefore, the fact that employees who misbe-
have while working in the south are more concentrated in higher levels of gravity may be
interpreted in at least two ways: the ¯rst possibility is that workers in the south misbe-
have in a more serious manner; the second possibility is that the personnel o±ce, in the
communication letters to the employees, describe misconduct episodes in the south as
more serious, leading the team of researchers to classify them in higher levels of gravity.
Under the ¯rst interpretation this evidence would favor the hypothesis of lower
individual e®ort in the south, while the second interpretation would favor the hypothesis
of discrimination. However, it should be noted that unfair accusations of misconduct can
be always taken to court by the employee and the Italian litigation procedure code gives
to the plainti® the choice between the court of the branch in which he/she works and
the court corresponding to the head quarters of the company. Therefore, the ¯rm has
to be careful in preparing the case, given the risk of trial: expectations on what judges
will decide have a decisive in°uence on this preparation and in particular on the content
of the noti¯cation letters.26 If the ¯rm expect judges to be biased in favor of workers
in the south it may be induced to describe the episodes of misconduct di®erently from
what they are in reality not because of discrimination but simply as a rational strategy
in this three actors game.
A further substantial piece of evidence against the hypothesis of discrimination
is o®ered by table 10. This table measures the e®ect of regions on the intensity of
the punishment through the estimation of ordered logit models in which the dependent
23Therefore, positive coe–cients imply that the variable is associated with misconduct episodes of
greater gravity and the opposite is true for negative coe–cients, while in tables presenting odds ratios
the reference value to understand the sign of the eﬁect of each variable is 1.
24Among the eﬁects of these controls it is interesting to note that the gravity of misconduct tends
to decrease during the late ’80s; female or more educated workers commit misconduct of lower gravity
while, not surprisingly, the opposite is true for managers. Employees with previous experience, who were
found on average to be less prone to misconduct, if they do misbehave they do it in a less serious way.
Past turnover between branches seems to lead to higher gravity and the same happens for the number
of past wage increases per year of tenure, although this latter result appears of di–cult interpretation.
25To save space we omit the tables concerning these results.
26The role of judges and of verdict expectations in shaping the strategies of the ﬂrm and of the
employee in case of con￿ict will be the explicit focus of a forthcoming paper in this research project.
12variable ranks in six categories of increasing severity the sanctions tabulated in table 5.27
While in column 2, employees working in the south are associated with more se-
vere punishments, in column 1, controlling for the type and gravity of misbehavior, the
regional e®ect disappears. A similar result occurs in columns 3 and 4, which focus on the
e®ect of the region of birth. In other words, misbehaviour of equal type and gravity is
punished with the same severity in the north and in the south. If there existed discrim-
ination, one would have expected southerner employees to be not only recorded more
often for misbehaviour but also to be punished more severely for similar misconduct
episodes. The available evidence suggests that this is not the case.
All in all, the evidence described in this section does not suggest the existence of
any systematic form of regional discrimination in the way in which misconduct episodes
are brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce and are punished by the latter. In
order to exclude with greater con¯dence the hypothesis of discrimination we move in the
next section to the analysis of other outcome variables that might indicate the existence
of other forms of regional discrimination in the ¯rm under study.
5 Collateral Evidence on Other Outcome Variables
5.1 Internal Hierarchy and Promotions
We begin the analysis of collateral evidence by looking at how the region of birth and work
a®ect the likelihood of being in one of the three major categories in which the employees
of this bank are divided: managers, white collars and low service workers. In table 11
we present the regional odds ratios of being in the top or bottom categories, instead of
the intermediate one, calculated from multinomial logit models. The employees working
in the south are signi¯cantly less likely to be managers instead of white collars than
the employees working in the north, but they are also signi¯cantly less likely to be low
service workers. While the ¯rst ¯nding may be interpreted as evidence of discrimination
in the access to higher management levels, it is probably explained by the location of
headqarters in the north. Anyway, this conclusion would be at odds with the estimates by
region of birth. Employees born in the south are signi¯cantly more likely to be managers
than white collars, although they are also more likely to be low service workers than
white collars. So, by region of work, southerners are concentrated in the intermediate
category while by region of birth they are dispersed in the top and bottom categories.
The hierarchical dispersion of employees born in the south, suggests the existence of
greater heterogeneity in the family backgrounds of these workers, inasmuch as these
backgrounds a®ect future labor market careers.
The evidence on promotions between levels is presented in table 12.28 Ap r o m o t i o n
is de¯ned as a change of level occurring during the outcome period with respect to
the level observed in the month of November preceding the outcome period. Without
27The six categories are: 1 = verbal reproaches; 2 = written reproaches; 3 = suspensions of less than
5 days; 4 = suspensions between 5 and 9 days; 5 = suspension of 10 days; 6 = ﬂring or voluntary quit.
28Levels are deﬂned according to the methodology suggested in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994).
13controls, employees born or working in the south are approximately 3% less likely to be
promoted, but when controls are included these e®ects are no longer estimated to be
signi¯cant, except for the e®ect of the southern region of work in column 5. But even
this e®ect disappears in column 6 where we control for the hierarchical level of the worker
before the outcome period through the inclusion of 14 level dummies in the regressions.
Employees working in the center are instead estimated to be signi¯cantly less exposed
to the possibility of a promotion, a fact that might be related to the higher incidence of
illness episodes described in section 6. But focusing just on the south-north comparison
the evidence presented in this table, and in particular in column 6, suggests that for given
individual characteristics and past behavior, southern workers are not discriminated in
promotions.
Where discrimination, if anything, appears more likely is in the case of females,
who are 17% less likely to be promoted even when they have the same observable char-
acteristics as men (see column 6) . Note that this is true even controlling for the past
number of illness episodes, that is one crucial dimension in which females appear less pro-
ductive than men as shown in section 6. Regional di®erences in promotions are anyway
insigni¯cant if compared to gender di®erences.29
5.2 Wages and Supervisors' Evaluations
As far as compensation levels are concerned we have information only on the cross
section of workers on payroll in November 1994, but the evidence is consistent with the
¯ndings on hierarchies and promotions described above for the entire panel. Table 13
reports the OLS coe±cients of (log) earning functions. In column 1 employees working
in the center or in the south are estimated to earn 3% less than their colleagues working
in the north, but in column 2, employees born in the center appear indistinguishable
from those born in the north and those born in the south earn 2% more. When both
classi¯cations are included in column 3, the divergence between the e®ects of working
and birth environments become even larger and more signi¯cant: employees working in
the north are paid more, independently of the region of birth, but employees born in the
north are paid less independently of the region of work.
While the e®ect of the working environment is likely to be due to the fact that higher
managerial levels are located in the north near to the head quarters, the positive e®ect
of the southern region of birth is hardly reconcilable with the existence of discrimination
against southern workers. In any case, in column 6 where we control for the hierarchical
level of workers, the region of work becomes absolutely insigni¯cant (the estimate is
precisely zero for those working in the south) while employees born in the center and in
the south are estimated to earn 1% more than those born in the north. In other words
within levels and controlling for individual characteristics and past behavior workers
born in the south are certainly not discriminated in terms of wages and if anything they
are favored.
29The size of these gender diﬁerentials is a well known fact in the Italian ﬂnancial sector and, at least
in this bank, it has fostered several initiatives, conducted in co-operation with trade unions, aimed at
reducing gender discrimination and at favoring the access of females to the highest hierarchical levels.
The evaluation of the eﬁects of these initiatives will be the object of a forthcoming paper in this research
project.
14Note that wage di®erentials within levels are in large part due to non-contractual
individual merit bonuses or wage increases. This is the only dimension in which dis-
criminatory wage policies, if it exists, can take place in a highly unionised and regulated
industrial relations environment. 14 level dummies alone explain in fact almost 90% of
the variance of wages for all employees and 8 level dummies explain 60% of the variance
for non managerial employees. The comparison with gender di®erentials is instructive:
column 6 shows that within levels and controlling for individual characteristics females
earn a substantial 7% less then men. At least in comparison with females southern
workers can hardly be considered discriminated in terms of wages.
This is even more true if one considers the determinants of the probability of higher
supervisors' evaluations presented in table 14. This table reports the coe±cients of or-
dered logit models in which the dependent variable is the evaluation given by supervisors
t on o nm a n a g e r i a lw o r k e r sd u r i n gt h em o n t ho fD e c e m b e ro fe a c hy e a r . 30 Column 6 in
this table shows that, controlling for individual characteristics and hierarchical levels,
both females (wherever born) and employees born in the south tend to receive better
evaluations but the gender e®ect is more than 10 times larger than the regional e®ect.
Yet females are paid less then men while workers born in the south are paid more than
their colleagues born in the north.
Looking at the ¯rst two columns in table 14 one might conclude for the existence of
regional discrimination in the evaluations given by supervisors: this because employees
born or working in the south appear to be signi¯cantly associated with worse evaluations.
But column 3 shows that the e®ect of the southern region of birth disappears once we
control for the region of work. This fact is quite important: given the small dimension of
migration °ows from north to south, supervisors of employees working in the south are
likely to be southerners and in addition we know from table 11 that employees born in the
south are more likely to be in the managerial category that evaluates lower categories.
Secondarily, when we control for individual characteristics and in particular for lev-
els in the last three columns the negative regional e®ects become statistically insigni¯cant
or turns positive. Only employees working in the center appear to receive signi¯cantly
better evaluations: a result which appears somewhat puzzling given the evidence on the
incidence of illness presented in table 6.
Putting together the evidence on misconduct and the evidence on careers and
promotions, the hypothesis of regional discrimination seems to ¯nd very little support
in our data.
6 Regional Di®erentials in Absenteeism due to Ill-
ness
If discrimination can be excluded on the basis of the above evidence, the incidence of
illness episodes is another dimension in which regional di®erences seem to suggest the
existence of productivity di®erentials.
30The restriction to non managerial workers explain the smaller sample size in these regressions.
Evaluations take values from 1 to 6.
15Columns 1 and 3 in table 15 report the raw frequencies of at least one episode of
absence due to illness, occurred during the outcome period, by region of birth and by
region of work: the employees working in the center appear to be 20% more likely than
their colleagues working in the north to be sick at least once during an outcome period (12
month); those working in the south are instead only 10% more likely. The di®erences by
region of birth are similar. Columns 2 and 4 in the same table report instead the average
number of episodes per outcome period for those worker-year observations in which at
least one episode was observed: those who are sick at least once have approximately 5
episodes of absence every two years if they work in the south or center and 4 if they
work in north; the di®erence is slightly smaller by region of birth. Therefore, in this
table, the central working and birth environments play a dominant role with respect to
the frequency of at least one episode of absence. Nevertheless, also the southern working
and birth environments appear to be associated with a higher probability of illness, and
in particular with a higher number of episodes among those who are absent at least once.
These regional di®erences are particularly striking if compared with the evidence
for the entire Italian population. Table 17 displays the death rates per 100000 inhabitants
by region and by type of disease. These death rates are always substantially lower in the
south compared to the north and center for all types of diseases except for the category of
unclassi¯able diseases and for the residual category.31 Unless fatal and non-fatal diseases
hit the two regions in opposite ways, the southern environment seems to be characterised
by a lower incidence of illnesses. It is therefore surprising that absenteeism due to health
related reasons among the employees considered by this study is signi¯cantly higher in
the south.
In order to ensure that the di®erences observed in our sample are statistically
signi¯cant, Table 18 estimates the incidence of morbidity through Poisson regressions
in which the dependent variable is the number of illness episodes (zero or positive) per
outcome period.32 Column 1 shows that the incidence rate is 39% higher for those who
work in the south and 46% higher for those who work in the center. Column 2 shows that
also the central and southern backgrounds of birth expose individuals to higher risks of
illness. Yet it is important to note that the raw e®ect of the birth dummies is largely
due to the correlation between region of birth and work. In fact in column 3, controlling
for the region of work the south dummy is insigni¯cant and the central dummy implies
a reduction of risk.
The incidence of illness remains signi¯cantly higher in central and southern work-
ing regions even when time, individual characteristics and individual past behavior are
controlled for in columns 4, 5 and 6.3334 Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, when
31And in these two cases diﬁerences are relatively small.
32Note that the this approach combines the consideration of the likelihood of at least one episode and
of the number of episodes.
33In these regressions note, in particular, the high incidence of absence for female (at least 60% higher
than for male): this is one of the few aspects of female performance on the job that may explain why
(see below) women are mistreated in terms of wages, promotions and careers. Another aspect that we
will explore in forthcoming research on gender diﬁerentials is the lower willingness of females to accept
turnover between branches because of family problems. The willingness to move is traditionally one of
the most important preconditions for promotions in this bank as shown also in table 12.
34Before 1990 only regular absence episodes of at least one day are recorded in our dataset while for
later years we have information on all the absence and late arrival episodes of any duration. For this
16these controls are added, the central and southern regions of birth acquire again the pos-
itive signi¯cance lost in column 3, even controlling for the region of work. This evidence
suggests that there is something in the birth environment that increases the incidence
of morbidity even controlling for individual characteristics.
Yet, in columns 4, 5 and 6, the working environment more than the birth environ-
ment plays the dominant role in increasing the incidence of illness episodes. Looking at
the estimates in column 6, which include the maximum number of controls, employees
working in the center and in the south face an incidence of illness that is respectively
31% and 20% higher than the incidence faced by employees working in the north, while
for the employees born in the center and in the south the incidence increases just by 5%
and 13% respectively.
As for the analysis of misconduct episodes, further interesting insights on the role of
birth and working environments is o®ered by the analysis of the incidence of illness within
the subsamples of employees born or working in di®erent regions. Table 16 contains for
each of these subsamples the raw frequencies of at least one episode (the top ¯gure in each
cell) and the average number of episodes for the observations with at least one episode
(the bottom ¯gure). Table 19 reports instead the incidence of morbidity computed from
the results of Poisson regressions estimated on each subsample. The central working
environment increases signi¯cantly the incidence of illness (at least by 30%, row 1 in
table 19) for the employees born in every region and in particular for those born in the
center (by 76%, row 1 in table 19). Interestingly, though, the employees born in the
center are on average less prone to illness if they migrate , i.e. if they work in the south
(36% less, row 3 in table 19) or in the north (16% less, row 3 in table 19).
The crucial role of the working environment is highlighted by the fact that those
who migrate from north to south (between birth and work) face an increase of almost 40%
in the incidence of illness with respect to stayers (column 1 in table 19) and assimilate
themselves completely to the morbidity characteristics of the arrival southern working
region (column 6 in table 19). While in the case of misconduct episodes migrants from
south to north reduce the likelihood of misconduct with respect to stayers but do not
fully assimilate to northerners, in the case of illness the assimilation is complete: column
4 in table 19 shows that the incidence of morbidity is the same among those working in
the north independently of the region of birth.
7 Conclusions
The regional di®erentials documented in this paper are striking, but certainly do not
have an easy explanation. Because of the nature of the observed indicators of individual
performance, they are potentially open to at least two preliminary di®erent interpreta-
tions. The fact that employees working or born in the south are substantially more likely
to be reported and punished for misconduct could be an indication of lower productivity
but also an indication of discrimination. The evidence o®ered in this paper allows to
reason in column 3 of table 18 the 90-95 spline eﬁect is very large and signiﬂcant. We estimated the
same regressions on 1995 only, to check for possible distortions caused by the above problem, ﬂnding
no relevant diﬁerence with respect to the results presented in the text.
17exclude the latter hypothesis because there is no sign of discrimination in the process by
which misconduct episodes are brought to the attention of the personnel o±ce nor in the
process by which these episodes are punished. Furthermore, no sign of discrimination
on a regional basis is o®ered by the evidence on careers and promotions. And ¯nally the
evidence provided by another potential indicator of lower productivity, i.e. absenteeism
due to illness, replicates almost exactly the evidence o®ered by misconduct episodes.
And this occurs even if, over the total Italian population, the incidence of illnesses seems
to be lower in the south.
Since the hypothesis of discrimination can be excluded, this paper provides a mea-
sure of regional productivity di®erentials due to individual e®ort, that, as far as we know,
have rarely (if ever) been identi¯ed and measured in Italy. These di®erentials are mea-
sured within the population of employees working in a single large bank with branches
distributed over the entire territory. This allows to exclude that the evidence might be
due to job related characteristics.
Checking whether the observed evidence could be due to discrimination was a
necessary preliminary step before considering the possibility of regional di®erentials due
to individual e®ort. But now the ultimate causes of these di®erentials remain to be
explored.
Given the focus on misconduct and shirking labor economists might be inclined
to search for explanations based on the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1994) model of e±ciency
wages. Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) show, with similar plant level data for the US
Auto Industry, that greater wage premia with respect to the local alternative wage and
higher local unemployment rates reduce misconduct episodes, as predicted by that model.
However, in our case, this interpretation seems unlikely to hold, although a more carefull
testing precedure is necessary to dismiss it with con¯dence. Indeed, the wages paid by
our bank imply higher wage premia in the south, where, in addition, unemployment
rates are substantially higher. And yet, misconduct episodes and absenteeism are more
frequent.
A more promising line of research is instead represented by the hypotheses proposed
and tested at the macro level by Putnam (1993) concerning the role of civic traditions in
northern and southern Italian regions. \Collective life in the civic regions [of the north]
is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that
others will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus full¯lling their expectations. In
the less civic regions [of the south] nearly everyone expects everyone else to violate the
rules. It seems foolish to obey the tra¯c laws or the tax code or the welfare rules, if you
expect everyone else to cheat. So you cheat, too, and in the end everyone's dolorous,
cynical expectations are con¯rmed." (p. 111.)
The role of the working environment in our evidence is reminiscent of the mecha-
nism described by this quote. But at the same time Putnam, quite convincingly, traces
back the di®erent degrees of civic-ness in northern and southern regions to their me-
dieval history. This suggests that also the pre-labor market environment, captured by
the region of birth, should contribute to explain the observed evidence, even controlling
for the working environment. The macro level of Putnam's analysis suggest that both
these e®ects should be at work but does not allow to disentangle their relative strength
at the individual level. One of the questions left open by his fascinating book is how
18much of the e®ect of worse or better civic traditions absorbed by an individual in the
birth environment is o®set by better or worse civic traditions in the work environment.
Our data seem to o®er the possibility to answer this question and this objective comes
next on our research agenda.
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20Table 1: Regional distribution of employment - selected years
By region of work
year north centre south total
1974 10379 2702 1879 14960
69.38 18.06 12.56 100.00
1978 11605 3103 2214 16922
68.58 18.34 13.08 100.00
1982 12738 3551 2591 18880
67.47 18.81 13.72 100.00
1986 12234 3577 2582 18393
66.51 19.45 14.04 100.00
1990 11821 3461 2594 17876
66.13 19.36 14.51 100.00
1994 11494 3468 2781 17743
64.78 19.55 15.67 100.00
Total 248532 70301 51624 370457
67.09 18.98 13.94 100.00
By region of birth
year north centre south total
1974 8977 2870 3256 15103
59.44 19.00 21.56 100.00
1978 9957 3298 3811 17066
58.34 19.32 22.33 100.00
1982 10931 3775 4332 19038
57.42 19.83 22.75 100.00
1986 10658 3721 4179 18558
57.43 20.05 22.52 100.00
1990 10285 3621 4134 18040
57.01 20.07 22.92 100.00
1994 10068 3596 4249 17913
56.20 20.07 23.72 100.00
Total 215261 73864 84656 373781
57.59 19.76 22.65 100.00
Note: Employees born and working in Italy, on payroll during the month of November of
each year (row frequencies in parentheses). Total employment is diﬁerent in the two panels
because of missing information on the region of work for workers temporarily not assigned to
any branch. The ﬂgures for total employment in the panel by region of birth are the ones that
describe correctly the complete cross-sectional and time series structure of the dataset.
21Table 2: Raw frequencies of misconduct by region of work and birth
work north work centre work south marginal freq.
born north 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.007
born centre 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.011
born south 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.014
marginal freq. 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.009
Note: Cells in rows (i) and columns (j) 1 to 3 contain the raw frequency of a misconduct
episode concerning a worker born in region i and working in region j. The last column (row)
contains the marginal frequency of a misconduct episode concerning a worker born (working)
in region i (j). The bottom-rigth cell contains the average frequency over the entire sample.
The denominator of these frequencies is the number worker-year observations in each regional
cell; the numerator is instead the number of misconduct episodes recorded and punished by
the personnel o–ce for each regional cell.
22Table 3: E®ect of the region of work and birth on the probability of misconduct
Model : 123456
#o b s: 370457 373781 370457 370457 370193 370193
work center 1.74* 1.71* 1.69* 1.75* 1.71*
(0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
work south 2.40* 1.87* 1.84* 1.85* 1.78*
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
birth center 1.66* 1.02 1.02 0.99 0.99
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
birth south 2.08* 1.35* 1.36* 1.33* 1.34*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
spline 7579 0.99 0.99 1.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
spline 8084 1.17* 1.17* 1.18*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
spline 8589 0.95* 0.96* 0.97x
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)








white collars 0.86* 0.69*
(0.05) (0.05)
low service wkr. 0.81x 0.59*
(0.08) (0.06)
previous experience 0.98* 0.98*
(0.00) (0.00)
n. prev. promotions 0.14*
(0.04)
n. levels jumped 2.01*
(0.33)
n. prev. branches 0.81
(0.14)
n. prev wage incr. 0.01*
(0.01)
n. prev. illnesses 1.53*
(0.06)
Note: Odds ratios computed from logit models of the probability of misconduct episodes.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation
is a worker in a given year; the dependent variable takes value 1 when a misconduct episode
is recorded and punished during the outcome period by the personnel o–ce. The numbers of
events like promotions, wage increases, changes of branches etc. are divided by tenure.
23Table 4: Estimated probability of misconduct by region of birth and work
Only Only Only Only Only Only
born born born work work work
north centre south north centre south
#o b s: 214956 71078 84423 248532 70301 51624
work center 1.39x 1.98* 1.66*
(0.22) (0.24) (0.18)
work south 2.38* 2.29* 1.80*
(0.49) (0.59) (0.13)
birth center 0.89 1.27 0.85
(0.11) (0.21) (0.26)
birth south 1.39* 1.66* 1.05
(0.10) (0.30) (0.22)
Note: Odds ratios from logit models of the probability of misconduct episodes. Each model
is estimated on diﬁerent subsamples for each region of work and birth. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation is a worker in a given
year; the dependent variable takes value 1 when a misconduct episode is recorded and punished
during the outcome period by the personnel o–ce.
24Table 5: Types of sanction and their distribution
Type of sanction Freq. Percent Cum.
Verbal reproach 1 39 1.15 1.15
Verbal reproach 2 22 0.65 1.79
Verbal reproach 3 676 19.86 21.65
Verbal reproach 4 73 2.14 23.80
Verbal reproach 5 851 25.00 48.80
Written reproach of local sup. 248 7.29 56.08
W r i t t e nr e p r o a c ho fh e a dq u a r t . 649 19.07 75.15
1 day of suspension from pay 95 2.79 77.94
2 days of suspension from pay 100 2.94 80.88
3 days of suspension from pay 73 2.14 83.02
4 days of suspension from pay 3 0.09 83.11
5 days of suspension from pay 91 2.67 85.78
6 days of suspension from pay 3 0.09 85.87
7 days of suspension from pay 3 0.09 85.96
8 days of suspension from pay 7 0.21 86.16
10 days of suspension from pay 93 2.73 88.90
Firing or induced quit 378 11.10 100.00
Total 3404 100.00
Note: The number characterizing verbal reproaches indicates increasing gravity of the reproach,
not subsequent reproaches.
Table 6: Distribution of types of misconduct episodes
Misconduct type Freq. Percent Cum.
Absence and late arrival episodes 283 15.22 15.22
External violations 576 30.98 46.21
Internal violations 827 44.49 90.69
Incorrect behavior on the workplace 173 9.31 100.00
Total 1859 100.00
Note:For the deﬂnition of the four types of misconduct episodes, see section 4.2.
25Table 7: Types of misconduct and regions of work and birth
Type of misconduct Region Odds ratio St. err.
Delays and late arrivals work center 2.06* 0.43
work south 0.72 0.18
birth center 1.31 0.30
birth south 1.59x 0.31
External violations work center 2.73* 0.42
work south 1.94* 0.28
birth center 1.02 0.18
birth south 2.17* 0.31
Internal violations work center 1.87* 0.27
work south 2.84* 0.39
birth center 0.92 0.14
birth south 0.95 0.12
Incorrect behaviour in the workplace work center 1.54 0.46
work south 1.28 0.35
birth center 0.85 0.27
birth south 1.59 0.39
Note: Odds ratios from multinomial logit models of the probability of misconduct type. The
omitted reference category is no misconduct. Standard errors are reported in parentheses with
p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation is a worker in a given year; The analysis is restricted
to the 1980-1994 period for which information on type of misconduct is available.
Table 8: Distribution misconduct episodes by level of gravity
Misconduct gravity Freq. Percent Cum.
level 1 92 4.95 4.95
level 2 531 28.56 33.51
level 3 455 24.48 57.99
level 4 209 11.24 69.23
level 5 248 13.34 82.57
level 6 118 6.35 88.92
level 7 106 5.70 94.62
level 8 100 5.38 100.00
Total 1859 100.00
26Table 9: E®ect of the region of work and birth on the probability of higher misconduct
gravity
Model : 123456
#o b s: 1826 1859 1826 1826 1825 1825
work center -0.15 -0.25 -0.25 -0.20 -0.16
(0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
work south 0.31* 0.44* 0.45* 0.33x 0.37x
(0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
birth center -0.08 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.09
(0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
birth south 0.11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.05 -0.09
(0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
spline 8084 0.07 0.10 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
spline 8589 -0.04 -0.07x -0.07x
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)








white collars -1.12* -0.82*
(0.14) (0.20)
low service wkr. -1.52* -1.11*
(0.23) (0.28)
previous experience -0.02x -0.03x
(0.01) (0.01)
n. prev. promotions 1.34
(0.96)
n. levels jumped -0.14
(0.60)
n. prev. branches 0.91
(0.44)
n. prev wage incr. 3.20
(1.46)
n. prev. illnesses 0.11
(0.10)
Note: Coe–cients of ordered logit models of the probability of increasing misconduct gravity.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation
is a misconduct episode; the dependent variable is the ordinal measure of misconduct gravity
described in table 8. The analysis is restricted to the 1980-1994 period for which information
on gravity of misconduct is available. The numbers of events like promotions, wage increases,
changes of branches etc. are divided by tenure.
27Table 10: Severity of punishment controlling for misconduct type and gravity
Model : 123456
#o b s: 1826 1826 1859 1859 1826 1826
misconduct gravity 0.81* 0.82* 0.82*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
external violations -0.20 -0.23 -0.20
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
internal violations 0.64* 0.62* 0.64*
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
insubordination -0.28 -0.27 -0.27
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
work center -0.17 -0.16 -0.10 -0.14
(0.11) (0.10) (0.19) (0.18)
work south 0.14 0.34* 0.05 0.27
(0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.15)
birth center -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02
(0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.19)
birth south 0.14 0.27* 0.11 0.10
(0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15)
Note: Coe–cients of ordered logit models of the probability of more severe sanctions. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. The dependent variable is the
ordinal indicator of sanction severity described in section 4.3. An observation is a misconduct
episode. The analysis is restricted to the 1980-1994 period for which information on gravity
and type of misconduct is available.
28Table 11: Internal hierarchy and regions of work and birth
category Region Odds ratio St. err.
managers work center 0.64* .012
work south 0.72* .013
birth center 1.55* .028
birth south 1.47* .022
low service workers work center 1.00x .02
work south 0.69* .01
birth center 1.08* .02
birth south 1.47* .02
Note: Odds ratios from a multinomial logit model of the probability that an employee is a low
service worker or a manager. The omitted refrence category is white collar worker. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation is a worker
in a given year.
29Table 12: Determinants of promotions between hierarchical levels
Model : 123456
#o b s: 365853 369141 365853 365853 365830 365552
work center 0.94* 0.93* 0.93* 0.91* 0.92*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
work south 0.97x 0.98 0.98 0.95* 0.96
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
birth center 0.96* 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
birth south 0.97x 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
spline 7579 0.88* 0.88* 0.92*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
spline 8084 0.97* 0.97* 0.95*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
spline 8589 1.09* 1.09* 1.10*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)










low service wkr. 2.68*
(0.08)
previous experience 0.98* 0.97*
(0.00) (0.00)
n. prev. promotions 0.07*
(0.01)
n. levels jumped 2.95*
(0.17)
n. prev. branches 1.62*
(0.07)
n. prev wage incr. 19.75*
(2.29)
n. prev. illnesses 0.73*
(0.02)
level dummies YES
Note: Odds ratios from logit models of the probability that a worker is promoted during the
outcome period Standard errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An
observation is a worker in a given year. The numbers of events like promotions, wage increases,
changes of branches etc. are divided by tenure.
30Table 13: Determinants of log earnings
Model : 123456
#o b s: 17717 17887 17717 17717 17717 17717
work center -0.03* -0.08* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
work south -0.03* -0.10* -0.02* -0.01* 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
birth center 0.00 0.07* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
birth south 0.02* 0.08* 0.01x 0.01x 0.01x
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
female -0.10* -0.08* -0.07*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
school years 0.01* 0.01* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
tenure 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
white collars -0.57* -0.49*
(0.00) (0.00)
low service wkr. -0.72* -0.59*
(0.01) (0.01)
previous experience 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
n. prev. promotions 0.27* 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
n. levels jumped 0.13* -0.06*
(0.01) (0.01)
n. prev. branches 0.08* 0.05*
(0.01) (0.01)
n. prev wage incr. 0.41* 0.22*
(0.02) (0.01)
n. prev. illnesses -0.01* -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00)
level dummies YES
Note: Coe–cients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of the wage
in November 1994. The sample is therefore given by the cross section of workers on payroll in
November 1994. Standard errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *.
The numbers of events like promotions, wage increases, changes of branches etc. are divided
by tenure.
31Table 14: Determinants of supervisors evaluations
#o b s: 14327 14469 14327 14327 14327 14327
work center 0.05 0.18* 0.16x 0.32* 0.30*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
work south -0.37* -0.36* -0.19* -0.02 -0.10
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
birth center -0.01 -0.17x -0.10 -0.13 -0.08
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
birth south -0.23* -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
female 0.10x 0.38* 0.47*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
school years -0.01 -0.04* -0.10*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
tenure 0.10* 0.08* 0.05*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
previous experience -0.01 -0.01x 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
n. prev wage incr. 10.26* 6.92*
(0.54) (0.54)
n. prev. illnesses -0.62* -0.52*
(0.03) (0.03)
level dummies YES
Note: Coe–cients from ordered logit models of the probability that a worker receives more
favourable evaluations from supervisors The sample is restricted to the cross section of non
managerial workers on payroll in November 1994, for which supervisor’s evaluations are avail-
able. Standard errors are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. The numbers
of events like promotions, wage increases, changes of branches etc. are divided by tenure.
32Table 15: Raw indicators of morbidity by region of birth and work
Work Birth
1234
North 0.187 2.038 0.188 2.056
Center 0.223 2.508 0.211 2.431
South 0.209 2.539 0.206 2.367
Note: Columns 1 and 3 report the frequencies of observations with at least one episodes of
absence due to illness during the outcome period respectively by region of birth and work.
Columns 2 and 4 report the average number of episodes for the observations with at least one
episode.
Table 16: Raw indicators of morbidity for each combination of birth and working region
work north work centre work south
born north 0.187 0.213 0.203
2.046 2.317 2.597
born centre 0.167 0.223 0.158
1.938 2.544 2.144
born south 0.193 0.226 0.210
2.016 2.379 2.546
Note: The top ﬂgure in each cell is the frequency of observations with at least on episode of
absence due to illness during the outcome period; the bottom ﬂgure is the average number of
episodes for observations with at least one episode.
33Table 17: Death rates by region and type of illness in the Italian population
Type of disease North-Center South
Infectious diseases 4.2 2.5
Cancer 301.8 172.9
Mental diseases 29.9 16.6
Cardiovascular diseases 431.3 350.8
Respiratory diseases 63.1 57.7
Digestive tract diseases 51.7 46.8
Traumatic diseases 56.2 38.1
Unclear symptomes 20.8 23.2
Others 63.3 70.2
Total 1022.3 778.8
Note: The table reports death rates per 100000 inhabitants for the year 1990. Source: ISTAT,
Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1990, Table 3.21.
34Table 18: Estimated incidence of illness episodes
Model : 123456
#o b s: 370457 373781 370457 370457 370193 370193
work center 1.47* 1.52* 1.44* 1.34* 1.31*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
work south 1.39* 1.38* 1.23* 1.23* 1.20*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
birth center 1.32* 0.96* 0.97x 1.05* 1.06*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
birth south 1.26* 1.00 1.04* 1.13* 1.13*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
spline 7579 0.99 1.00 1.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
spline 8084 0.97* 0.97* 0.96*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
spline 8589 0.96* 0.95* 0.97*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)








white collars 2.02* 1.78*
(0.02) (0.02)
low service wkr. 2.84* 2.39*
(0.04) (0.04)
previous experience 1.01* 1.01*
(0.00) (0.00)
n. prev. promotions 0.68*
(0.04)
n. levels jumped 0.99
(0.04)
n. prev. branches 0.96
(0.02)
n. prev wage incr. 0.22*
(0.02)
n. prev. illnesses 1.22*
(0.00)
Note: Incidence rates estimated from Poisson regressions in which the dependent variable is
the number of illness episodes during the 12 months of the outcome period. The number of
episodes ranges from 0 to 76 per outcome period with an average of 0.43. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation is a worker in a
given year; The numbers of events like promotions, wage increases, changes of branches etc.
are divided by tenure.
35Table 19: Incidence of illness episodes by region of birth and region of work
Only Only Only Only Only Only
born born born work work work
north centre south north centre south
#o b s: 214956 71078 84423 248532 70301 51624
work center 1.29* 1.76* 1.38*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
work south 1.38* 1.05 1.37*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
birth center 0.84* 1.15* 0.64*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
birth south 1.02 1.09* 1.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Note: Odds ratios from logit models of the probability of an illness episode. Each model
is estimated on diﬁerent subsamples for each region of work and birth. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses with p<0.05 = x,p <0.01 = *. An observation is a worker in a given
year; the dependent variable takes value 1 when an illness episode is recorded during the
outcome period.
36